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EUPHEMISTIC CODES AND
TELL-TALE HEARTS: HUMANE
ASSISTANCE IN END-OF-LIFE
CASES
George P. Smith, It
Presently I heard a slight groan and I knew it was the
groan of mortal terror ... No doubt I now grew very
pale; but I talked more fluently, and with a heightened
voice. Yet, the sound increased - and what could I do?
It was a low, dull, quick sound - much such a sound as
a watch makes when enveloped in cotton. I gasped for
breath ... but the noise steadily increased.. Oh God!
What could I do ... They heard! - they suspected! - they
knew!... I felt that I must scream or die!... I shrieked
... it is the beating of his hideous heart!1
INTRODUCTION AND HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A EUPHEMISM IS DEFINED as "the substitution of an
agreeable or inoffensive word or expression for one that is harsh,
indelicate, or otherwise unpleasant or taboo: allusion to an offen-
sive thing by an inoffensive expression."2 This article discusses
medical euphemisms used commonly through medical codes in
hospitals for end-of-life patient care. It examines the extent to
which fear shapes decision-making in critical care units - fear of
medical failure, and fear of litigation if not "everything" is done to
prolong life, no matter how agonizing. Furthermore, being trained
to save lives, health care providers often lack the courage to let a
t B.S., J.D., Indiana University; LL.M. Columbia University; LL.D., Indiana
University; Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D.C.
1 EDGAR ALLAN POE, The Tell-Tale Heart, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF EDGAR
ALLAN POE: TALES AND SKETCHES 1843-49, 789, 794, 797, (Thomas Olive Mabbott
ed. 1978).
2 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LAN-
GUAGE UNABRIDGED 784 (Philip Babcock Gove ed. 1986).
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patient die - especially when care has been provided for an ex-
tended period of time.
The average drowning person, when asked if he would like a
life preserver would usually answer in the affirmative. If, however,
such a person were to be told that after receiving the preserver the
boat would be unable to land for some two weeks during which
time he would be dragged and probably drown he would probably
rethink the initial decision to accept the life preserver. Similarly,
when requests are made of physicians to "do everything" in critical
care settings, many, lacking courage or fearing professional and
legal consequences, will not explain the potential results of the
procedures to the patient or the family. If, however, candor and
honesty were shown in the initial instance, a Do Not Resuscitate
Order (DNR) would, more often than not, be written and agreed to
by all concerned parties.3
Shortly after the development and refinement of resuscitative
techniques in the early 1960's, it became clear that only a minority
of patients who were successfully resuscitated survived until hos-
pital discharge.4 Because many resuscitated patients were critically
ill, extremely elderly, or severely and irreversibly demented, re-
suscitation oftentimes served only to prolong suffering or to sus-
tain patients in a persistent vegetative state.5 Accordingly, physi-
cians, patients and patients' families became increasingly con-
cerned that resuscitation was not always in the best interests of the
patient.
6
Soon, a growing number of physicians shared the opinion that
resuscitation of all patients often violated the "ethical principle of
non-malfeasance (not doing harm)," and because patients and their
families or surrogates were increasingly demanding more in-
3 See Anita Pursino, Letter to the Editor, 20 HEART & LuNG: J. CRITICAL CARE
316, 317 (1991) (highlighting the benefits of discussing resuscitation with patients
and families). See generally Daniel P. Sulmasy et al., The Quality of Mercy: Caring
for Patients with 'Do Not Resuscitate' Orders, 267 JAMA 682 (1992) (examining the
quality of care for patients with DNR orders); Robert M. Walker, DNR in the OR:
Resuscitation as an Operative Risk, 266 JAMA 2407, 2411 (1991) (advocating ap-
propriate use of intraoperative DNR orders through open and supportive patient-
physician relationships).
4 See Mark H. Ebell, Practical Guidelines for Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 50
AM. FAM. PHYsicIAN 1293, 1293 (1994) (citing W. B. Kouwenhoven et al., Closed-
Chest Cardiac Massage, 173 JAMA 1064, 1064-67 (1960)).
5 See George P. Smith, II, Utility and the Principle of Medical Futility: Safe-
guarding Autonomy and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Unusual Treatment, 12 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 1, 34 (1995).6 See Ebell, supra note 4.
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volvement in the decision to resuscitate, the medical community
ultimately developed DNR orders.7 DNR orders direct hospital
staff not to apply resuscitative measures if and when cardiac or
8
respiratory arrest occurs. While it has been well established that
physicians acting in concert with competent patients or their des-
ignated surrogate decision-makers have the legal right to issue
DNR orders,9 the law provides few clear standards which address
them.' °
There are but two basic responses to individuals in cardio-
pulmonary arrest: order-code or no code." To code a patient
means - in essence - to commence cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR). A no code - most commonly, DNR - means no aggressive
assistance will be given to a patient in medical distress.' 2 Many
consider a CPR order to be a "bad prognostic sign" because, put
simply, few code survivors leave the hospital.13 Indeed, an in-
hospital survival rate of fifty percent is considered quite impres-
sive. 14
7 Id. at 1293-94.
8 See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDI-
ctNE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-
SUSTAINING TREATMENT 250-51 (1983) (discussing applicability of DNR orders);
Bridget Ann Berry, The Right to Die: Florida Breaks Through the Legal Deadlock,
12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 607, 620 (1984) (citing Custody of a Minor, 385 Mass. 697,
698 n.1 (1982)).
9 See Carol Ann Mooney, Deciding Not to Resuscitate Hospital Patients:
Medical & Legal Perspectives, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1038-44 (1986) (suggest-
ing a framework for determining the appropriateness of resuscitation efforts for hos-
pital patients as well as who should have the legal right to make such decisions).
10 See id. at 1031.
" See Judith M. Saunders & Sharon M. Valente, Code/No Code? The Question
That Won't Go Away, NURSING, Mar. 1986, at 60, 62.
12 Id. See generally Dean M. Hashimoto, A Structural Analysis of the Physician-
Patient Relationship in No-Code Decisionmaking, 93 YALE L.J. 362 (1983) (propos-
ing that the prolongation of life should remain a choice for the terminally ill and that
no-code status should be an option for a competent non-terminal patient).
13 J. Gary Grant, The No-Code Decision-A Doctor's Perspective, NURSING,
Mar. 1986, at 63.
14 Id. The Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the American Medical As-
sociation has reported that in approximately one third of some two million patient
deaths occurring in hospitals in the United States each year, CPR is attempted in
approximately one-third of this population. Of those receiving CPR, one-third sur-
vives and another third of these individuals survive, in turn, until discharge from the
hospital. Ultimately, the success or failure of CPR resuscitation depends upon the
nature and severity of a patient's major illness before arresting. See COUNCIL ON
ETHICAL & JUDICIAL AFFAIRS, AM. MED. ASS'N, Guidelines for the Appropriate Use
of Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 265 JAMA 1868, 1868-69 (1991) (discussing guide-
lines for the use of CPR in the absence of DNR orders).
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Even for no code patients, frequent re-assessments, perhaps
every seventy-two hours, should be made in an effort to re-
evaluate a physician's orders and give supportive or palliative care
to the distressed patients. 15 Communication of this no code should,
as well, be given to all members of the patient's health manage-
ment team. 
16
CPR was developed originally to preserve life, restore health,
relieve suffering, and limit disability of persons who unexpectedly
went into cardiac arrest. 17 It is a desperate invasive procedure that
was not intended to delay the impending death of patients who are
suffering from terminal illnesses. Despite this, health-care institu-
tions have classified CPR as an "emergency" procedure for which
patients' consent is presumed absent a pre-directive to the con-
trary. 18 This classification led to the expanded use of CPR, well
beyond the select group of patients for which it was intended, and
therefore a pervasive, indiscriminate, and often contraindicated use
of CPR by health-care workers. 19 In fact, some states enacted leg-
islation codifying the expectation of resuscitation in an attempt to
ensure the administration of CPR to hospital inpatients.2 °
A further cause of the contraindicated use of CPR has been
the rise in patient autonomy and informed consent. This rise pre-
cipitated the shift in the decision-making power regarding the
withdrawal or refusal of advanced life-saving medical technolo-
IS See Saunders & Valente, supra note 11, at 64. See also Roberto Bernabel
et al., Management of Pain in Elderly Patients with Cancer, 279 JAMA 1877
(1998) (discussing the need to improve proper pain management). See generally
George P. Smith, II, Death Be Not Proud: Medical, Ethical and Legal Dilemmas
in Resource Allocation, 3 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH & POL'Y 47 (1987) (discussing
various care issues with respect to end-of-life patients).
16 See Saunders & Valente, supra note 11, at 64.
17 See Kathleen M. Boozang, Death Wish: Resuscitating Self-Determination
for the Critically Ill, 35 ARIZ. L. REv. 23, 24 (1993) (citations omitted) (specify-
ing that CPR was originally developed to prevent sudden unexpected death).
18 See id. at 25 (citations omitted). One state, New York, has codified a pre-
sumption in favor of resuscitation: "Every person admitted to a hospital shall be pre-
sumed to consent to the administration of cardiopulmonary resuscitation... unless
there is consent to the issuance of an order not to resuscitate as provided in this arti-
cle." N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2962(1) (McKinney 1993).
19 See George Annas, New York's Do-Not-Resuscitate Law: Bad Law, Bad
Medicine, and Bad Ethics, in LEGISLATING MEDICAL ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE NEW
YORK DO-NOT-RESUSCrrATE LAW 141, 149 (Robert Baker & Martin A. Strosberg
eds. 1995) (concluding that New York's DNR laws are unnecessary and ill-advised).
20 See Boozang, supra note 17, at 25, (citations omitted). See, e.g., N.Y. PUB.
HEALTH LAW § 2962 (McKinney 1993).
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gies. 21 Traditionally, the patient relied on the professional judg-
ment of physicians.2 2 Today, ideally, the medical model is patient-
driven, and thus when patient wishes are communicated or dis-
cerned, should be directive.23 As a result of these changes, physi-
cians and other health-care workers often administer CPR in situa-
tions they feel its use is contraindicated. Physicians make deci-
sions to use or withhold CPR while influenced by the fear of litiga-
tion, inappropriate or unclear guidelines, or the misguided direc-
tions of the patient or his family. These influences together with
additional extraneous factors cause many physicians' objective
judgements to become clouded by factors other than the patient's
best interests. 24 This often results in the contraindicated application
of CPR.
As the medical community became increasingly aware of the
harms that can be caused by the contraindicated use of CPR, phy-
sicians began to make decisions regarding the application of CPR
either without informing the patient or acting against his direc-
21 See Kate McMillan, Pre-Directives: Paper Swords and Shields, 37 THE AD-
vOCATE, May 1994, at 10 (discussing this shift in power as a result of the Supreme
Court's recognition of patients' rights grounded in the right to privacy in Quinlan and
Cruzan; Congress' enactment of the Patient Self Determination Act (PSDA), and the
proliferation of pre-directive statutes in all states). See also Compassion in Dying v.
Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454, 1461 (W.D. Wash. 1994) (stating that "squarely
faced with the issue, the Supreme Court would reaffirm Justice Rehnquist's tentative
conclusion in Cruzan that a competent person has a protected liberty interest in refus-
ing unwanted medical treatment. . ."), rev'd., 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). See gener-
ally Symposium, Physician-Assisted Suicide: Facing Death After Glucksberg and
Quill, 82 MINN. L. REv. 885 (1998) (presenting different facets of the physician-
assisted suicide debate). See generally David Orentlicher, The Alleged Distinction
Between Euthanasia and the Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining Treatment: Conceptually
Incoherent and Impossible to Maintain, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 837 (discusses several
justifications for euthanasia, including the autonomy of the patient).
22 See JAY KATz, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 2, 29 (1984)
(citing Alasdair Maclntyre, Patients as Agents, in PHILOSOPHICAL MEDICAL ETHICS:
ITS NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE 197, 205 (Stuart F. Spicker et al. eds., 1977) (discuss-
ing the changes in how doctors and patients communicate with each other). See gen-
erally Orentlicher, supra note 21.
23 See KATZ supra note 22, at 84 (explaining how doctors should talk with their
patients). But see Smith, supra note 5, at 1-2 (stating that "When medical treatment
is deemed 'futile,' it frees the physician from the moral, medical, and legal duty to
provide such treatment"). See generally EDMUND D. PELLEGRINO & DAVID C.
THOMASMA, FOR THE PATIENT'S GOOD: THE RESTORATION OF BENEFICENCE IN
HEALTH CARE 99-110 (Oxford Univ. Press 1988) (discussing the relationship be-
tween patients and physicians and suggesting several characteristics of patients which
foster a better relationship).
24 Smith, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing extraneous factors which may influence
physicians' CPR determinations).
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tions.2 These decisions often took the form of "slow codes,"
which directed responding personnel to deliberately act in a man-
ner which will not be effective in resuscitating the patient.26 Slow
codes were merely attempts by physicians to shield themselves
from litigation that could arise from an outward or written order
calling for the inaction of hospital personnel.27
This article will demonstrate that if autonomy or self-
determination is to be more than a poetic principle, with clinical
application to patients in end-of-life illnesses, it must be validated
by closer levels of communication between patients and their
health care providers before serious debilitating illnesses occur,
which all too often block rational thinking by the patient, his fam-
ily, or surrogate decision makers. 28 Such forthright communication
and ultimate decision-making before a medical crisis is a simple
and direct solution. There is no need whatsoever to deal with
euphemistic coding or, for example, tests of substituted judgment
or other artifices if patients articulate their life goals and medical
wishes through execution of advance directives. Sadly, without
this, patient autonomy must yield to physician autonomy 29 - yet,
an autonomy shaped hopefully by compassion30 and by standards
of sound professional judgment regarding futile medical treat-
ment 3l and - when challenged - submitted to review ideally byhospital ethics committees or, failing that, the courts. 32
25 See generally Marsha D. M. Fowler, Slow Code, Partial Code, Limited Code,
18 HEART & LUNG 533, 533 (1989) (discussing critical factors to be considered in
determining whether or not CPR or DNR is appropriate).
26 See id.
27 See id. at 533-34
28 See generally Joan Teno et al., Advance Directives for Seriously Ill Hospital-
ized Patients: Effectiveness with the Patient Self-Determination Act and the SUP-
PORT Intervention, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICs Soc'Y 500 (1997) [hereinafter Advance
Directives] (concluding that physician-patient communication has not been "sub-
stantially enhance[d]" by advance directives, the PSDA or SUPPORT).
29 See Donald J. Murphy & Thomas E. Finucane, New Do-Not-Resuscitate Poli-
cies: A First Step in Cost Control, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1641, 1644 (1993)
(quoting D. P. Schuster, Everything That Should Be Done-Not Everything That Can
Be Done, 145 AM. REv. REsPIR. Dis. 508, 508-09 (1992)).
30 George P. Smith, II, Stop in the Name of Love!, 19 ANGLO-AM. L. REv. 55
(1990).
31 See Smith, supra note 5 (defining medical futility and discussing factors
surrounding futility determinations).
32 See generally George P. Smith II, The Ethics of Ethics Committees, 6 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 157 (1990) (predicting the betterment of hospital ethics
committees as decision-makers as delivery facilities adopt more comprehensive and
ethical programs).
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While it is always the preferred course - and the one advo-
cated by the American Medical Association33 - to test the standard
of futility according to individual patient values and goals, practice
has shown physicians simply do not discuss routinely CPR with
their adult patients who are admitted for medical and surgical
care.34 Indeed, there is a fuller discussion of DNR with AIDS and
cancer patients than with patients without diseases with poor prog-
noses (e.g., coronary artery disease or cirrhosis). 35 Similarly, in
order to avoid ambiguities in actual DNR orders, procedure spe-
cific orders should be given - with full documentation of the ra-
tionale for the order being set out.
36
It will be seen as well that legislative directives which seek to
furnish formal procedures governing decisions not to resuscitate
are undesirable, this because of the rigid codification of standards
that do not take into account the reasonable medical judgments
that vary with individual patient etiologies and prognoses as well
as the flexibility built into the doctrine of medical futility. Patient
self-determination can be more readily validated and sustained by
and through an alliance with personal physicians and health care
providers instead of legislators.
I. FRAMING THE CURRENT SOCIAL DEBATE
Three central questions shape the continuing societal debate,
not only about the use but the limitation of life-sustaining treat-
ments. They are: (1) Is there a limit to the obligation of medicine
to save or prolong life; (2) When decisions are made, whose views
and value systems control; and (3) Under what circumstances is
there a recognition that the benefits of treatment are outweighed by
the burdens? 37 Not only do these questions control the present de-
33 See Bernard Lo, Unanswered Questions About DNR Orders, 265 JAMA 1874
(1991) (noting that AMA guidelines respect patients' choice regarding CPR). See
COUNCIL, supra note 14, at 1870-71 (upholding the Council's position on the appro-
priate use of CPR and DNR orders).
34 See Lo, supra note 33, at 1875.
" See id.
36 See James A. Mittelberger, et al., Impact of a Procedure-Specific Do Not
Resuscitate Order Form on Documentation of Do Not Resuscitate Orders, 153 An-
CHIVES INTERNAL MED. 228 (1993) (describing problems caused by inadequate
documentation of DNR orders and proposing a standard procedure and form).
37 See Jessica H. Muller, Shades of Blue: The Negotiation of Limited Codes by
Medical Residents, 34 Soc. ScI. MED. 885, 896 (1992) (examining the use of partial
and slow resuscitation attempts).
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bate of the central issue, they structure the overall cultural frame-
work in which resident physicians negotiate limited codes.38
In the absence of a written Do Not Resuscitate Order, it is
standard hospital practice to require resuscitation for patients suf-
fering a cardiopulmonary arrest and force them, in essence, to die
in a code.39 For the house staff physicians and interns in most hos-
pitals, a DNR order in a patient's medical record lingering near
death typically limits the type of medical assistance provided to
the patient when he approaches death itself. On the contrary, the
absence of a DNR order obligates the residents to approach any
and all complications aggressively - treating the patient as though
he were acutely ill and not dying.n° The practical result of a situa-
tion of this nature is that the interns may very well expect to invest
considerable time - in the middle of the night - "working up" ei-
ther a very sick patient or coding one who is dying. The conse-
quence of this is that the interns are diverted from their other hos-
pital tasks and patient supervisions. Not only are such actions a
waste of time and energy, they are not cost effective.
41
When there are no demonstrable benefits to a medical inter-
vention that maintains an expiring patient other than the act of sur-
vival itself, the best interests of the patient may not be served by
resuscitation.42 Accordingly, in those cases where a physician -
more likely a resident, but occasionally an attending - is convinced
of the futility or potential harm of further treatment, an intermedi-
ate code may be negotiated. This action may well have the effect
of over-riding the wishes of the patient, family or even private or
attending physicians, but allows the resident physician a convo-
luted way to avoid hospital policies. Stated otherwise, such a
course of action, "allow[s] them a means of restricting their thera-
peutic activity when they confront[ed] the possibility of having to
provide treatment they not only [think is] futile but could also in-
flict significant harm on the patient. 43 The intermediate or limited
code has the ultimate effect, then, of providing a means by which
resident hospital physicians guard themselves, not only against in-
house disciplinary action and legal liability but also control as well
38 See id.
" See id. at 894.
40 See id. at 895.
41 See id.
42 See id. at 894.
41 See id.
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the extent to which they are forced to pursue futile drains of their
time and hospital resources. 44 It is an artful euphemism, to be sure.
While it is understandable that hospitals have guidelines for
physician behavior in the use of resuscitation, these codes of oper-
ating procedures fail to make allowance for patient variation and
contemporary clinical practices.45 Designed in response to unnec-
essary acts of resuscitation, DNR orders have given rise to yet an-
other moral dilemma: the negotiation of slow codes. Stated other-
wise, the slow or intermediate codes - while being a cultural re-
sponse to unworkable circumstances arising in clinical practice -
bring with their implementation and use a troubling ethical di-
lemma, they bypass the "very intent of the resuscitation guidelines:
to honor the principle of patient (or surrogate) autonomy and to
prevent physicians from making unilateral decisions about resusci-
tation by requiring a joint decision-making process. 46
In deciding whether to issue a DNR order, physicians have
been found to rely unduly on a patient's age and short-term prog-
nosis - giving those two factors a weight that goes beyond their
actual ability to predict life expectancy and quality of life. 47 In a
study of 6,802 seriously ill patients, with illnesses such as coma,
heart failure and cancer - with an average life expectancy of six
months - some interesting findings were made. 48 First, compared
with other medical specialists, surgeons waited nearly twice as
long to write a DNR for a very sick patient while intensive care
specialists and lung specialists were most likely to issue a DNR
and cardiologists the least likely. With age as a factor in the issu-
ance of DNR orders, it was found that only twenty-two percent of
the patients under age fifty-five had DNR orders compared with
fifty-six percent of those over 85. DNR orders were written most
rapidly for patients older than seventy-five. 49
All too often, ambiguities are found in DNR orders. A rather
simple effort to issue a procedure specific DNR order and include
44 See id. at 895.
41 See id. at 896.
46 id.
47 See Rosemarie B. Haldn et al., Factors Associated with Do-Not-Resuscitate
Orders: Patient' Preferences, Prognoses, and Physicians' Judgments, 125 ANNALS
INTERNAL MED. 284, 292 (1996) (reporting on a study examining patient's prefer-
ences for resuscitation and the frequency and timing of DNR orders).
48 Id. at 284.
49 Id. at 288.
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the rationale for the order has been found to be an effective way to
lessen both confusion and eliminate ambiguity. 50
II. UTILIZING CODES
When there are no orders written which specify what resusci-
tative measures should be taken with particular patients, hospital
policies may well dictate that a full code should be called for, in
other words, resuscitation is initiated. 5 Yet, circumstances may
arise where it is just as appropriate - instead of calling a code - to
initiate minimal resuscitative measures which do not rise to the
level of being a full code and might be termed a "short code." 52
This type of code is sometimes referred to as a show code and al-
lows the health care personnel to initiate resuscitation and then
proceed to stop their actions either after a few tried or a period of
time predetermined. 53 This code is taken largely as a symbolic ges-
ture designed to re-assure or placate the family of a patient - or the
health care personnel, themselves - that "everything was done."
54
The show, soft, slow, partial, limited or light blue codes are
all considered intermediate codes. Each designation conveys perti-
nent information concerning not only the type, but also the extent
of response to be followed in the event of a patient suffering car-
diopulmonary arrest. Thus a partial, limited, or soft code is taken
commonly to set forth those circumstances where either drugs
50 See Mittelberger et al., supra note 36, at 231 (providing an investigation of
the advantages of a procedure-specific and rationalized DNR order). See also Eze-
biel J. Emmanuel, Attitudes and Desires Related to Euthanasia and Physician-
Assisted Suicide Among Terminally Ill Patients and Their Caregivers, 284 JAMA
2460 (2000) (reporting a survey of 988 terminally ill patients during 1996 and 1997,
where it was found that a majority of the respondents (60.2%) held the opinion that
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide should be available to Americans-with
10.6% of them, concluding they would consider these choices for themselves).
51 See Felice Quigley, Legalities of the No Code/Slow Code, PENN. NURSE, Oct.
1988, at 15 (discussing liability for failure to follow hospital policy on codes). See
also Judith Wilson Ross & Deborah Pugh, Limited Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation:
The Ethics of Partial Codes, 14 QUALITY REV. BULL. 4.4 (1988).
52 See Quigley, supra note 51, at 15. (discussing nurses' predicament when
hospital staff neglects to clarify patients' code status).
53 Interview with Sarah Shannon, Ph.D., R.N., Biobehavioral Nursing & Health
Systems, University of Washington, in Seattle, Washington (Dec. 9, 1997).
54 See Muller, supra note 37, at 890, 896 (discussing the negotiation of "slow
codes" and "show codes"). See also John F. Peppin, Physician Neutrality and Patient
Autonomy in Advance Directive Decisions, 11 ISSUES L. & MED. 13, 20 (1995).
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might be administered without chest compressions or where resus-
citation initiated but drugs or intubation would be withheld.5
Very often the uses of intermediate codes arise from informal
arrangements negotiated verbally, often at night, between residents
and nurses who reach an agreement - before a patient goes into
cardiac arrest - regarding the courses of action or inaction to be
taken. Attending physicians are sometimes consulted - with the
ultimate decision regarding the use of a limited code being negoti-
ated between the attending physician and the house staff. Although
usually not formalized in writing, occasionally the stated medical
reasons for selecting one resuscitative technique over another were
in fact written in the patient's record. Clearly, then, intermediate
codes are little more than clinical deviations from established hos-
pital protocols and regulations. As such they are not easily ob-
served nor acknowledged publicly.56
A. Types of Partial Codes
Medical realities and patient desires shape the parameters for
issuance of partial codes. It is within this spectrum that marked
confusion and disagreement occur primarily because of a failure
by hospital personnel to differentiate partial codes according to
their intents and purposes. Thus, it is essential to first distinguish
between partial codes for patients who are monitored and those
who are not. 7 Then, distinctions must be made between patients
with and without specific medical conditions (e.g., chronic ob-
55 See id. Dr. John Goldenring has suggested that four "shades" of code blue are
used clinically. Under a Dark Blue (or Full) Code, all possible measures are under-
taken by a resuscitation team until it becomes clear that resuscitation is no longer
possible. A Navy Blue Code calls for resuscitation, with the patient deserving sodium
bicarbonate and one dose of cardiotonic medication and possibly one defibrillation. A
Sky Blue Code allows resuscitation to be performed, and sodium bicarbonate to be
given, but no cardiotonic drugs are administered. Finally, a Light Blue Code does not
allow for the use of drugs - with cardiopulmonary resuscitation alone being per-
formed on those patients "until the staff (who do not wish to resuscitate) can find an
attending physician who will (it is hoped) call off the effort." John Goldenring, Cor-
respondence, 300 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1052, 1058 (1979).
56 Muller, supra note 37, at 890. Some physicians have even ordered slow codes
when they are in disagreement with a patient's request for resuscitation. See John F.
Peppin, Physician Neutrality and Patient Autonomy in Advanced Directive Decisions,
11 Issus L. & MED. 13, 20 (1995). See also Lo, supra note 33, at 1875 (noting the
physicians' use of limited or partial DNR orders without considering the patient's
wishes).
57 Ross & Pugh, supra note 51, at 6.
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structive pulmonary disease) which - in the event of full codes -
may result in complications such as ventilator dependence.
58
Partial codes may be distinguished, additionally, by the par-
ticular intent of the orders. The question is then: are the code or-
ders being motivated by patient autonomy or by a health care pro-
vider's standard of beneficence? While autonomy, the patient's
right to direct the course of medical treatment consistent with his
life values, is acknowledged not every patient (or family) prefer-
ence can or should be followed. Under the principle of benefi-
cence, a health care provider must ascertain whether his actions
contribute to a patient's well being. Thus, a conflict often arises
when these two foundation principles come into play.
59
There are essentially four situations in which partial codes
may be written. The first arises when, for example, a partial code
(e.g., "basic CPR only") is ordered as a result of a family refusal to
consent to a DNR order. Most often, the physician is responding in
such a case to what is believed to be an irrational family response
in the first instance. Such an order may also be given in writing
when discussion of approaching death with either the patient or the
family is infeasible; yet the attending physician wishes to convey
an obviously deceptive impression "that all that can be done is be-
ing done." Because of external problems in such a situation, then,
a preferred DNR cannot be given. Yet, because the physician has
determined that the best medical interests of the patient will be
served by no resuscitative effort, a partial code may be ordered.
Although such a use is motivated properly by beneficence, issuing
a partial code under these circumstances is considered - under
most circumstances - to be unethical. 6°
A second type of partial code is seen in cases where patients
are on monitors. Here, for example, a "chemical code only" (or the
use of cardiac drugs) is most commonly ordered when either a pa-
tient or his family has requested a DNR order or consented to its
issuance. Because the physician, and even possibly the patient
5s See id. at 7. The President's Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in
Medicine and Biomedical and Behavioral Research concluded that "partial codes"
and "slow codes" may be used interchangeably. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR
THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL
RESEARCH DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENTS (1983). Yet, others
consider partial codes as either a sub-category or a totally different form of "slow
codes." See Ross & Pugh, note 51, at 4.
59 See Ross & Pugh, supra note 51, at 6-7.
60 Seeid. at7.
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and/or the family, are of the opinion that either the patient's actual
condition or present quality of life are stabilized to such a degree
that desirable efforts should be pursued to prevent an actual arrest,
at the same time there is an understanding not to reverse it if it
were in fact to occur. Thus, in a case of this nature, preventing an
arrest is sought by simply treating pre-arrest symptomatologies. 61
When the patient or family expresses an unambiguous and
reasoned decision not to allow ventilator use to prolong life, a
third situation arises where a partial code such as - "do not intu-
bate" - may be written. Typically, this situation presents itself
when the physician reveals to all concerned parties that because of
the patient's condition (e.g., chronic obstructive pulmonary dis-
ease) once respirator care is initiated, there will be little chance of
weaning the patient from the respirator. Although the physician
places reliance upon an accurate prognosis, the patient or family
makes the actual decision for the code.
62
The fourth and most difficult of all partial codes for health
care providers is seen in cases where an order such as, "do not in-
tubate," is written at the request of a competent patient who, for
personal reasons, does not wish specific parts of the code per-
formed. Normally, the basis of these reasons is to be found in fears
that the patient will become either a vegetable or an untubated ap-
pendage to a machine. Simply because a competent patient makes
a request of this nature, does not mean it must be respected; if it
does not comport with a sound medical judgment by a health care
provider, it will not be executed. Beneficence will usually trump
autonomy.
63
The inherent problem with partial codes is that patients and
their families simply fail to realize that there are not discrete ele-
ments in resuscitation plans. Thus, from a medical perspective, a
patient should submit to full resuscitation or no resuscitation.
64
Medical realities ultimately dictate euphemistic requests for less
than effective full treatment options will not always be followed.
When patient requests are made for a full resuscitative effort
"except intubation and ventilation," they are made normally with-
out a full understanding that to undertake such an effort, intubation
6 See id.
62 See id
63 See id. See generally PELLEGRINO & THOMASMA, supra note 23 (discussing
health as the central aspect of all medical relationships and ventures).
64 See Ross & Pugh, supra note 51, at 8.
2000]
HEALTH MATRIX
for maximal oxygenation will normally be required as well as ven-
tilator assistance necessary to stabilize the patient. If it is deter-
mined subsequently that ventilator support is required for the
longer term, the patient may thereupon request the withdrawal of
support.
65
Similarly, when patients view CPR decisions, they may re-
quest - for example - chest massage and mask ventilation and
nothing more. Such a decision fails to take into consideration the
fact that CPR is a synergistic process - with each component
building upon the effectiveness of other components. Thus, the
first stage of CPR typically includes chest massage and artificial
respiration - followed, if necessary, by defibrillation and finally
cardiac drugs. While appearances might suggest the process is in-
deed severable, if the patient is in a monitored unit, cardiac drugs
might well be used first, with defibrillation beginning before chest
massage. For unmonitored patients, while resuscitation begins
with chest massage and artificial respiration, it is because there is
no other equipment really available. Resuscitative efforts that use
equipment are recognized as more effective than either chest mas-
sage or artificial respiration. 66
TI. FUTILITY AS AN OPERABLE STANDARD 67
Legislative definitions may be proffered for what is a terminal
medical condition and include incurable and irreversible condi-
tions "within reasonable medical judgment," which will either
cause death "within a reasonable period of time" or merely extend
the dying process. 68 Depending of course upon individual patient
65 See id. at 7 (explaining patient misconceptions of a full resuscitative effort).
66 See id. at 7-8.67 Information in the ensuing two paragraphs is derived from George P. Smith
II, Terminal Sedation as Palliative Care: Revalidating a Right to a Good Death, 7
CAMBRIDGE Q. HEALTHCARE ETHics 382, 384 (1998) (citations omitted). Other treat-
ments might include antibiotics, transfusions, and intensive care. See Lo, supra note
33 at 1874 (providing an example of a patient whose treatment would be considered
medically futile). See Alan Meisel, Pharmacists, Physician-Assisted Suicide, and
Pain Control 2 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 211 (1999). Interestingly, the 10 6 'h Con-
gress considered the Pain Relief Promotion Act of 1999 (H.R. 2260, S. 1272) in an
attempt to amend the Controlled Substances Act and thereby promote pain man-
agement and palliative care without permitting assisted suicide and euthanasia. See
Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolution on Pain Relief Promotion Act of
1999, 145 Cong. Rec. 57, 527-82, 57, 532-34 (June 23, 1999).
68 See WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 70.122.020(9) (West 2000).
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profiles and disease etiologies, medical judgment will vary regard-
ing when specified conditions are considered terminal.
One approach to resolving this quandary is found in the wider
acceptance of the doctrine of medical futility. By utilizing one of
five operative standards under this doctrine, a physician could
conclude that a patient's condition is indeed terminal and proceed
to search a wide range of palliation options - with terminal seda-
tion being a first order consideration. Accordingly, in cases where
a cure is physiologically impossible, continued treatment is non
beneficial, a desired or positive benefit is unlikely to be achieved,
a particular treatment option - although regarded as plausible - has
yet to be validated, or a determination is made that a course of
treatment is either quantatively or qualitatively futile, a physician
is freed ethically from pursuing further medical treatment.69 Bol-
stered by wide professional approbation of the doctrine, then, phy-
sicians exercising their best medical judgment would be allowed to
withhold CPR from patients in futile conditions, without actual
consent. 70 This humane action would, of course, only be under-
taken when it would be in the patient's best medical interests not
to have a hopeless, non-qualitative existence continued.
The American Heart Association's Guidelines for Cardiopul-
monary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiac Care allow resusci-
tation to be discontinued in pre-hospital (or field) settings when,
after an adequate trial of advanced cardiac life support, the patient
remains non-resuscitable. 71 Because of familial nonacceptance of
field termination of unsuccessful out-of-hospital cardiac arrest,
however, emergency medical services continue the medical cha-
rade of transporting pulseless patients to hospital emergency de-
partments - knowing fully that such actions must be considered
futile.72 As a consequence, the significant neurologic damage asso-
69 See Smith, supra note 5, at 6 (identifying the clinical uses of the futility doc-
trine).
70 See generally Tomlinson & Brody, Futility and the Ethics of Resuscitation,
264 JAMA 1276 (1990). See Leslie J. Blackball, Must We Always Use CPR?, 317
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1281, 1284 (1987) (arguing that when CPR has no medical benefit
a physician has no responsibility to provide it as a choice). See also Council supra
note 14, at 1871 (updating the council's position on the appropriate use of CPR and
Do-Not-Resuscitate orders).
71 Theodore R. Delbridge et al., Field Termination of Unsuccessful Out-Of-
Hospital Cardiac Arrest Resuscitation: Acceptance by Family Members, 27 ANNALS
EMERGENCY MED. 649, 650 (1996) (citing American Heart Association, Guidelines
for Cardiopulmonary Resuscitation and Emergency Cardiac Care VIII: Ethical Con-
siderations in Resuscitation, 268 JAMA 2282, 2282-88 (1992).
72 See id.
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ciated with resuscitation by aggressive advanced life support,
many questions remain open as to initial decisions to initiate the
procedure in the first instance. A high patient price - with signifi-
cant family distress - is quite often the end result of such efforts.
73
The probability that resuscitative effort will provide more
than a marginal benefit appears to be the emerging - and most ac-
ceptable - basis for determining whether to initiate aggressive
treatment. 74 Under this standard, cardiopulmonary patients who are
near death and unlikely to survive after CPR is administered are
clearly an identifiable group who would be benefited marginally
by such resuscitative efforts. 75 In essence, under this standard, a
clear example is seen of the codification of a futile treatment and a
validation of the medical principle of triage.76 For example, CPR
has been labeled a futile act for patients with metastatic cancer -
this simply for the reason that survival after CPR is reported to be
zero.
77
A. The Ineffectiveness of Advance Directives
In three recent studies of the value and effectiveness of ad-
vance directives in the treatment of end of life cases, it was shown
rather conclusively that directives such as living wills and other
written proxies rarely have much impact on the care of dying pa-
tients.78 Sadly, the studies disclosed that only about one-fifth of
patients write down their treatment preferences in the form of an
73 See Michael Callahan & Christopher D. Madsen, Relationship of Timeliness
of Paramedic Advanced Life Support Interventions to Outcome in Out-of-Hospital
Cardiac Arrest Treated by First Responders with Defibrillators, 27 ANNALS EMER-
GENCY MED. 638, 638 (1996).
74 See Murphy & Finucane, supra note 29, at 1645 (citations omitted).
75 See generally id. (citations omitted) (adding that the size of this group is un-
known but believed to be quite large).
76 See George P. Smith II, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L.
& Poi'Y 143, 146 (1985).
77 See Lo, supra note 33, at 1874 (describing when CPR is considered medically
futile). See also Lawrence J. Schneiderman & Nancy Jecker, Futility in Practice, 153
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 437, 439 (1993) (suggesting that the medical community
use a degree of quantitative analysis to achieve consensus on the definition of futile
treatment); Tom Tomlinson & Diane Czlonka, Futility and Hospital Policy, HAST-
INGS CENTER. REP., May-June 1995, at 28 (discussing the development of hospital
policies for futile resuscitation).
78 See supra note 28; Joan M. Teno et al., Do Advance Directives Provide In-
structions That Direct Care?, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SoC'Y 508 (1997); Joan Teno, et
al., The Illusion of End-of-Life Resource Savings with Advance Directives, 45 J. AM.
GERIATRICS Soc'Y 513 (1997).
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advance directive and usually do not even tell their physicians of
these actions. Accordingly, in approximately one third of these
cases do documents of this nature find their way into the patient's
medical chart.79 Most directives were found to be too vaguely
worded to be of any assistance in guiding specific decisions about
medical treatment such as whether to try to resuscitate a gravely ill
patient when his heart stops.
80
One study reviewed the medical charts of 4,804 dying patients
in five hospitals and found only 688 advance directives from 569
patients - with only 22 being specific enough to provide assistance
to physicians with patient preferences. The other directives were
only general expressions of a willingness to die rather than prolong
dying through artificial means.
8 1
The central purpose behind the promotion of advance direc-
tives was to enhance substantially a level of education and infor-
mative communication among physicians and their patients - all
designed to resolve patient uncertainty over end of life treatments.
These studies show conclusively that no discourse is being stimu-
lated.82 They re-enforce the notion that the physician is, by de-
fault, once again the main actor in the concluding drama of life.
IV. LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL
RESUSCITATION: AN EFFECTIVE STRATEGY?
As of 1994, only two states, New York and Georgia, have en-
acted statutes that furnish formal procedures governing decisions
not to resuscitate. 83 Although the two laws differ significantly, the
key standards of both are relatively similar,84 and generally corre-
spond to the resuscitation guidelines that are published by the
American Medical Association and required in accredited hospi-
tals. Those guidelines direct that a physician intending to issue a
79 See Teno et al., supra note 28, at 507.
80 See Teno et al., supra note 78, at 511.
81 See id at 509-10.
82 See id. at 511-12. See also Barbara E. Cammer Paris et al., Roadblocks to Do-
Not-Resuscitate Orders: A Study in Policy Implementation, 153 ARCHIVES INTERNAL
MED. 1689, 1689-98 (1993) (analyzing a study which demonstrated that a lack of
communication between attending physicians and attendants is a major obstacle to
obtaining a DNR order); Walker, supra note 3.
83 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-79 (McKinney 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §
31-39-3 (1996); Ebell, supra note 4, at 1294.
84 See N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW §§ 2960-79 (McKinney 1993). But see GA.
CODE ANN. § 31-39-3 (1996). See also Ebell, supra note 4, at 1294-5.
85 See generally Mooney, supra note 9, at 1032-33 (citations omitted).
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DNR order must take several preliminary steps. First, he must "de-
termine that the patient's death is so certain and so imminent that
resuscitation would serve no purpose. 86 Second, he must obtain
either the informed consent of the patient or the approval of the
patient's family or surrogate. 87 If the patient is competent, the pa-
tient himself should decide whether to refuse resuscitation.88 "If
the patient is incompetent to make the decision .... the same fam-
ily members who must consent to a post-mortem examination must
approve entering a DNR order."89 Next, the physician must ensure
"[t]he patient's medical chart ... [reflects both] .. .the decision
not to resuscitate and the consent of the patient or family mem-
bers." 90 Finally, the physician must review the decision daily. 91
Despite their binding effect, a number of physicians some-
times choose unilaterally to disregard such DNR guidelines, and
without consulting or obtaining approval from the patient's family
or surrogate issue unwritten orders to medical personnel not to re-
suscitate severely and irreversibly demented, or incompetent and
terminally ill patients. 92 Generally, such orders or slow code deci-
sions are made when physicians believe strongly that resuscitation
is not in the best interest of the patient, and the patient's family or
surrogate disagrees. 93 The physician "may feel compelled by con-
science to do secretly what [he] feels is right," 94 or he may simply
have concluded that it is "not worth the effort to effect [resuscita-
tion] in the event of cardiac or respiratory arrest." 95 In any event,
the physician usually "pass[es] along the word" that the patient is
to be slow coded, and nurses and other medical personnel are then
expected to take their time in responding to the patient's arrest, or
merely to pretend to take appropriate resuscitative measures.
96
86 Id. at 1034.
87 See id.
" See id.
89 Id.
90 Id.
9' See id. at 1034-35.
92 See John 0. Neher, The "Slow Code": A Hidden Conflict, 27 J. FAM. PRAC.
429, 429 (1988) (discussing the policy concerns of not following the resuscitation
orders as written in hospital records).
93 See id.
94 id.
95 Smith, supra note 5, at 5.
96 David Anderson, Death and Dying: Ethics at the End of Life, RN, Oct. 1988,
at 42, 46.
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A. The New York Approach: An Analysis
By legislating the authority to issue DNR orders to clinicians,
the New York state legislature hoped it could increase the level of
care to seriously ill patients and the level of doctor-patient com-
munication. The New York Task Force and the legislature held the
opinion that if they reduced the liability of clinicians, DNR orders
would become more prevalent and controlled, thereby eliminating
the need for "slow codes."
1. Statutory Provisions
On April 1, 1988, New York's "do not resuscitate" law, which
was signed into law by Governor Mario Cuomo, became effec-
tive.97 The law "establishes a presumption in favor of the patient's
implied consent to CPR, [as well as] the lawfulness of a DNR or-
der if the order is issued in compliance with the [statute]" 98 "The
law allows [competent] adult[s] ... to authorize ... DNR order[s]
in conjunction with [their attending] physician.99" "Where [the pa-
tient] lacks capacity, or ... is a minor, the law allows for the ap-
pointment of a surrogate" whose judgment may be substituted for
that of the patient.'1° Interestingly, when no surrogate is available,
a DNR order is limited to those cases where "to a reasonable de-
gree of medical certainty, resuscitation would be medically fu-
tile."' 0 '
The law limits specifically the application of DNR orders to
the withholding or withdrawal of CPR.10 2 The law also requires
that each hospital establish a mediation system for the purpose of
97 N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2960 (McKinney 1993).
98 Susan M. Golden, Comment, Do Not Resuscitate Orders: A Matter of Life
and Death in New York, 4 J. CoN EMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 449, 451 (1988).
99 Id.
100 Id. If there are no qualified surrogate decision-makers available, an attending
physician or hospital may initiate judicial proceedings for a judgment authorizing the
issuance of an order not to resuscitate. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2976(1)
(McKinney 1993). This action is merited in those cases "where the patient has a ter-
minal condition, is permanently unconscious, or resuscitation would impose an ex-
traordinary burden on the patient in light of the patient's medical condition and the
expected outcome of the resuscitation." Id. It is provided further that this DNR order
not be inconsistent with the patient's religious and moral beliefs and be in regard to
the patient's wishes or-alternatively-made in his best interests. See id. § 2976.0l N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2966 (McKinney 1993).
102 See Golden, supra note 98. See also BARRY R. FURROW El AL., BIOETI-cs:
HEALTH CARE LAW AND ETmcs 293-96 (3d. ed. 1997) (discussing New York state
laws on DNRs).
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mediating disputes regarding the issuance of DNR orders 10 3 and
requires further that if the dispute has not been settled within sev-
enty-two hours, the participants must be notified of their right to
judicial appeal. 104 Finally, the law extends immunity from criminal
prosecution, civil liability, and charges of unprofessional conduct
to all hospital personnel and persons acting in good faith under the
law.105
2. New York State's Need for Legislation
Prior to the adoption of this law, New York developed a body
of common law, which limited the right of surrogates to refuse
life-sustaining treatment on behalf of incapacitated patients who
had not previously expressed their desire not to be resuscitated.
106
Given the fact that both prior to and after the enactment of the "do
not resuscitate" law patients were involved in DNR decisions only
thirteen to twenty-eight percent of the time (incapacity required
surrogate involvement in the remainder), it is apparent why New
York decided to legislate a change to the common law. 0 7 The
DNR legislation served as a mechanism for the legislature to pro-
vide for the legal authorization of surrogate decision-making in a
state that had, heretofore, and continues to this day, to have a judi-
cial tradition of opposition to substituted judgment. 10 8 So strong
has been this opposition that since 1990 with the case of Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health, 109 New York remains only one
of two states requiring clear and convincing evidence before life-
sustaining measures, once commenced, may be terminated. 1°
103 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972(1)(a) (McKinney 1993).
104 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2972(3) (McKinney 1993).
105 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2974 (McKinney 1993).
106 See Russell S. Kamer & John A. McClung, New York's Do-Not-Resuscitate
Law: Burden or Benefit?, in LEGISLATING MEDICAL ETHICS: A STUDY OF THE NEW
YORK Do-NoT-REsuscrrATE LAW 227, 230 passim (Robert Baker et al., eds., 1995)
(using Matter ofStorar, 52 N.Y. 2d 517 (1988) as an example).
o7See id. at 230-3 1.
108 See id. at 230 (citing Matter of O'Connor, 72 N.Y. 2d 517 (1988) as an ex-
ample of a decision limiting the use of substituted judgment).
109 497 U.S. 261 (1990) (holding that Missouri could constitutionally require
clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment).
110 See Annas, supra note 19, at 149. Missouri is the other state. See id.
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3. Overall Successes and Failures
The New York statute has not only been found to be success-
ful in limiting the use and need for slow codes - in large part by
granting express immunity from suit to health care workers utiliz-
ing them in good faith' - but it has advanced and underscored the
bioethical ideal of a shared physician decision-making process of
deliberation.' 2 Yet, this whole process has - at the same time -
been found to create confusion which, in turn, diminishes the very
humanism of the DNR decision, increases futile CPR because of
delays in the issuance of DNR orders, and gives rise to "over-
interpretations" under the controlling statute." 3
No doubt, its central flaw, however, is the presumption that
all residents of New York have, in medical emergencies, consented
to CPR. 14 As seen, however, CPR is not always beneficial" 5 and -
when contraindicated - can result in excessive patient suffering as
well as draining medical expenses for maintenance of life thereaf-
ter." 6 Inasmuch as the principle of informed consent to medical
treatment is recognized and applied, it is difficult to understand
why a forced exception to this doctrine is made for CPR under the
statute. There is little, if any, reason to have a statutory classifica-
tion of DNR orders as separate and distinct from all other orders.
Indeed, all orders should be held to identical standards for issu-
ance.
4. Accreditation Policies under JCAHO
Complementing the New York DNR statute, the Joint Com-
mission on Accreditation of Health-Care Organization (JCAHO) in
1988, changed its accreditation requirements - all in an attempt to
encourage bioethical reforms with regard to the overall use of
DNR orders. 17 The reforms were codified as professional stan-
. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2974 (McKinney 1993).
112 See Robert Baker et al., The 7988 DNR Reforms: A Comparative Study of the
Impact of the New York DNR Law and the JCAHO Accreditation Requirements, in
LEGISLATING MEDICAL ETmICs: A STUDY OF THE NEW YORK Do NOT RESUSCITATE
LAW 263, 270.
113 See id. at 281-84. See also FURROW ET AL., supra note 102, at 295 (noting
that New York's law may even require CPR in cases where it is inappropriate).
114 See Annas, supra note 19, at 148, 150-5 1.
115 See id. at 151.
116 See id. (estimating that CPR will cost three to five thousand dollars).
117 See Baker et al., supra note 112, at 263 (discussing the self-regulative and
legislative approaches to bioethical reform).
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dards to be enforced subsequently as requirements for accredita-
tion. 118 They permit, essentially, each medical institution to deter-
mine for itself how best to document patient decision-making in
health care matters, protect patient's rights, and a number of re-
lated matters. 119 Predictably, the rather wide latitude permitted by
the JCAHO accreditation requirements has led to an assortment of
different and sometimes inconsistent policies.
120
5. Clinical Effectiveness
The objectives of both the New York DNR law and the
JCAHO accreditation requirements to enhance and strengthen co-
operative involvement among patients and their health care pro-
viders as to disclosure, documentation and consent in critical mat-
ters of health care services, have largely been achieved. 121 There
was unanimous agreement among respondents to one major study
published in 1995 of this issue which found that subsequent to
these two 1988 legislative and administrative reforms, there was
"substantial increase in the likelihood that DNR orders would be
discussed with patients at risk for CPR, and with their families,
and that any DNR orders implemented would have patient-family
consent."1 22 The study determined that the likelihood of direct dis-
cussions with patients doubled after the 1988 reforms. With spe-
cific reference to the use of "slow codes" and other covert, un-
documented orders, DNRs "decreased almost to the point of non-
existence."' 2 3
While it was found that the New York and JCAHO reforms
were equally effective, the 1995 study demonstrated - with regard
to the negative effects of the reforms - significant differences be-
tween the legislative and the professionally mandated models. 24 It
showed specifically that physicians in the state of New York per-
ceived the legally mandated DNR reform as delaying DNR orders,
increasing futile CPR, and diminishing the humanism of the actual
118 See id. at 280.
119 See id. at 287.
120 See id. (giving examples of the range of policies).
121 See id at 270-82.
122 Id. at 270.
123 See id. But see Paris et al., supra note 82, at 1694 (citing R. S. Kamer et al.,
Effect of New York State's Do-Not-Resuscitate Legislation on In-hospital Cardiopul-
monary Resuscitation Practice, 88 AM. J. MED. 108, 108-11 (1990) which found no
significant decline in resuscitative attempts following the enactment of the 1988
DNR legislation in New York).
124 See Baker et al., supra note 112, at 280-81.
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DNR decision. 12 Nevertheless, the study found that the physicians
practicing under them perceived the JCAHO reforms as "un-
equivocally beneficial." It suggested further that this difference in
perceptions between the two groups was not the consequence of
minor disagreements in the demands the reforms placed upon the
physicians, but rather the manner in which they were being im-
plemented.
126
By mandating that the JCAHO accreditation reforms be im-
plemented by the staffs of the physicians' own institutions where
they are credentialed, there is a much greater likelihood of the re-
form policies being implemented. This is a sound marketing strat-
egy, since the affected health care providers are allowed, under the
reforms, to revise or even revoke any part of the accreditation
policies found to be unworkable. 127 Indeed, one of the clearest les-
sons to be drawn from New York's experience with its DNR law is
that when attempting to regulate professional conduct through leg-
islation every effort should be made to preserve and utilize the
professional self-regulatory process.
28
Perhaps one of the most startling conclusions drawn from the
1995 study of the 1988 New York DNR reforms was that misinter-
pretations by New York clinical practitioners working under the
actual statute, accounted for "over-interpretations," or in other
words non-existent requirements. 29 Indeed, many of the most
poignant objections to the provisions of the statute have been
grounded in these clinical misreadings and over-interpretations. 3 °
Over-interpretations can also cause physicians to initiate futile at-
tempts at resuscitation - all as a direct consequence of their at-
tempts to comply with misread "requirements" of the DNR stat-
ute. 13 1 No doubt the medical community that the New York stat-
ute's presumption of consent to CPR mandates resuscitative efforts
are given to any patient without DNR orders sees the best illustra-
tion of this quandary in the persistent perception.
132
'" See id. at281-84.
126 See id. at 287-96.
127 See id. at 288.
'2' See id. at 293.
129 See id. at 289.
'30 See id. at 290.
131 See Kamer & McClung, supra note 106, at 230 (stating that the medical
community misperceives the law as placing a new duty on physicians to resuscitate
all patients).
132 See id.
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As might be expected, the New York DNR statute was shaped
and written within a legal context; a context which clinicians have
found foreign to their understanding of the statute's implementa-
tion. Put simply, legal rather than medical documentation was ad-
vanced as the template for surrogate DNR decisions. 133 In order to
ensure compliance with the statute, hospitals have thus been forced
to acquire legal representation. And, as a consequence of protect-
ing their client hospitals from liability, the attorneys have, them-
selves, added to the law's "over-interpretation"'134 and no doubt
enhanced their billable hours.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The "implicit but rarely articulated question in resuscitative
decisions" is "whether and when to [end] the [life] struggle against
death."'135 As has been seen, coded resuscitative efforts are nothing
but a subterfuge which all too often rob the patient at the end-of-
life of dignity and autonomy yet protects family members and the
assisting medical team from experiencing fully their own failures
in preventing the patient's death. 36 Unable to undertake a surgical
procedure with an assured statistical measure of, a coded patient
becomes - in reality - little more than a metaphoric euphemism for
a systemic failure of not only the patient himself, but of the medi-
cal establishment as well.
137
Only by developing a common understanding of, and shared
vocabulary for the dying process, 38 thereby promoting a free line
of communication among all affected parties, 139 can inhumane re-
suscitative efforts be stopped and codes eliminated altogether. In
the final analysis, "to understand a phenomenon, one must under-
133 "A surrogate shall express a decision consenting to an order not to resuscitate
... in writing, dated, and signed in the presence of one witness eighteen years of age
or older who shall sign the decisions . . ." N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 2965(4)(a)
(McKinney 1993).
134 See Baker et al., supra note 112, at 292-93. See generally Nancy Tecklenberg,
Comment, Medico-Legal Implications of "Orders Not to Resuscitate," 31 CATS. U.
L. Ray. 515 (1982) (analyzing several New jersey, Massachusetts and New York
cases regarding orders not to resuscitate).
t35 Kathleen Nolan, In Death's Shadow: The Meanings of Withholding Resusci-
tation, 17 HAsTINGS CENTER REP. 9, 11 (1987) (discussing the symbolic nature of
resuscitation and the meaning of death).
136 See id.
137 See id.
138 See id. at 14 (discussing the confusion over terminology and vocabulary).
139 See supra note 78.
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stand its language and its symbols. ' 'I 4° Heavy emotional connota-
tions flow from such terms as "persistent vegetative state," "CPR,"
and "do not resuscitate." Because of the varied connotations - and,
indeed, ambiguities - arising from the use of these words, trans-
mitting the precise information needed for a patient or his family
to understand the consequences flowing from their use is fraught
with misunderstanding.
14 1
If a comprehensive acceptance and use of the doctrine of
medical futility could be achieved as a pivotal measure to define
when cardiopulmonary resuscitation should be withheld,142 other
aids and constructs could be developed for guiding humane deci-
sion-making in end-of-life cases. For example, greater utilization
of and reliance upon hospital ethics committees could be promoted
when confusion or disagreement arises among patients, their fami-
lies, and attending physicians. 43 Fuller discussion of a patient's
code status before an episode of distress arises"44 together with un-
ambiguous documentation1 45 in the patient's medical record of
those medical reasons for selecting the particular techniques for
resuscitation (or non-resuscitation, as the case may be) would also
go far to dispel the need for slow or intermediate codes.
146
As observed, a freer exchange of information and a wider
level of consultation in conferences between the attending physi-
cians and the nurses charged with caring for terminally ill or de-
mented patients would go far to determine the parameters of the
patient's best interests in treatment or non treatment issues. Un-
documented knowledge could, in turn, be learned about patient
140 Nolan, supra note 135, at 9.
141 See Peppin, supra note 56, at 22-24 (showing that patients may not receive a
neutral presentation of advance directives and that the wording of the information
may significantly sway their decision).
142 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2966 (1) (McKinney 1993) (recognizing futil-
ity as the standard for issuing a DNR under New York statutory law.) See generally
Steven Miles, Futility and Medical Professionalism, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 873
(1995) (explaining what medical futility is and problems with its application by soci-
ety).
143 See Smith, supra note 32, at 158.
144 See Paris et al., supra note 82, at 1695.
145 See Miles, supra note 142, at 896.
146 See generally Tom Tomlinson & Howard Brody, Ethics and Communication
in Do-Not-Resuscitate Orders, 318 NEw ENG. J. MED. 43 (1988) (addressing the
ambiguities in DNR policy and procedure). See also Mittelberger et al., supra note
36.
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values and goals.1 47 These conferences would allow the nurses and
other health care members to share their reservations or questions
about the physician's orders and promote an open discussion of
views concerning, for example, the futility of continued treatment
-thereby permitting an opportunity for nurses or others to remove
themselves from compromising ethical situations before a medical
emergency is presented. 1
48
Even when all of this is said and done, there is a real concern
that increased documentation and enhanced levels of communica-
tions among all affected individuals in a particular case may be
inadequate to the task of curtailing unilateral decisions which have
the effect of eviscerating the doctrine of informed consent for the
patient or surrogate decision makers. To begin, even if legislatures
or hospitals were to require physicians to be more compulsive
about discussing and documenting the resuscitative preferences of
patients and their families, little would change, because the condi-
tions that foster slow codes would continue to exist. 49 Indeed, al-
though physicians in general might become more acquainted with
and more frequently document the personal values and wishes of
patients and their families, those physicians willing to order slow
codes in the first place would not likely be convinced by a simple
conversation to provide resuscitative measures which they know
will cause futile, cruel, and wasteful prolongation of life. Such
physicians are compelled by their own consciences to do what
they, and not patients' families or surrogates believe to be right. 1
50
Moreover, because the threat of litigation for malpractice and for
violation of the doctrine of informed consent has apparently not
precluded the use of physician-ordered slow codes,1 51 there is little
reason to conclude that the additional threat of litigation for failure
to conform to the documented wishes of a patient's family will.
Neither, it seems, would increased communication alleviate
the confusion and cynicism occasioned by slow code orders among
147 See Neher, supra note 92, at 430 (discussing the fact that physicians often
"order" slow codes for patients despite having little or no knowledge of patient's
goals, and knowing about the patient's life only during times of illness). See gener-
ally FURROW Er AL., supra note 102 (discussing the legal mechanisms used to ensure
that CPR is not withdrawn or administered against the patient's wishes).
148 See generally Mooney, supra note 9, at 1039-41 (citations omitted).
149 See Neher, supra note 92, at 430 (highlighting the fact that changes to the
requirements of physicians may fix some symptoms, but will not solve the overall
problem).
150 See id. at 429.
151 See id. at 430.
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health care personnel. Despite the opportunity to share their per-
sonal feelings of frustration, anger, fear, and helplessness with the
physician, and to remove themselves from participation in actual
slow code practices, nurses and other personnel will remain in the
ethical hot seat by virtue of their knowledge that a slow code was
ordered. 52 Unless they elect to report the physician to the hospital
administration, ethics committee, or to the police, such personnel
will expose themselves to the risk of liability for negligence.153
Because the past proposals for reducing the harms of slow
code orders simply drive the dilemma further underground, an ap-
proach must be developed which attempts to eliminate the slow
coding physician's very motive for deception. 54 Generally, as ob-
served, the slow coding physician believes that withholding resus-
citation is in the best interests of the patient, and undertakes to de-
ceive the family or surrogate when he cannot persuade them to
agree to authorize a DNR order. 155 The deception is necessary, he
argues, because it is the only means by which to circumvent the
decision of a recalcitrant family or surrogate who has been given
primary responsibility for determining whether to withhold resus-
citative treatment.1
56
By giving physicians the primary responsibility for making
the decision to withhold resuscitative treatment from incompetent
or terminally ill patients, however, legislatures and the medical
community would substantially diminish the motivation for order-
ing slow codes in the first place. 57 Such a decision-shifting
scheme would enable physicians to make openly and honestly the
decisions they were trained to make, and would no longer require
them to prescribe resuscitative measures that they deem to be fu-
tile, cruel or wasteful, or coerce them into committing secret
breaches of the standard of care or violations of the informed con-
sent doctrine. 58 In addition, because unilateral orders not to resus-
152 See Karen Ellis, The Slow Code Dilemma, REG. NuRSE, June 1987, at 28, 29
(discussing how "slow codes" may leave nurses in uncertain legal and ethical quan-
daries).
153 See generally BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1032 (6'h ed. 1991) (defining negli-
gence).
154 See generally Anderson, supra note 96, at 65.
I" See id. at 46.
156 See generally Mooney, supra note 9, at 1044-45 (discussing the duty of phy-
sicians to consent patient's guardians and family).
157 See Smith, supra note 5, at 17-18.
"' See id. See also E. Haavi Morreim, Profoundly Diminished Life: The Casual-
ties of Coercion, 24 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 34, 35 (1994). See generally Steven H.
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citate would not have to be issued in a deceptive manner, the con-
fusion and cynicism among health care personnel regarding such
orders would no doubt decrease. 159
While the physician would have "primary" decision-making
responsibility under the scheme, he would nevertheless retain a
duty to inform the patient's family or surrogate of his decision and
reasons thereof. 16° Such a duty protects the patient's autonomy and
surrogate's authority, while making "the physician accountable for
... decisions negligently made and those decisions not carefully
documented."' 161 Moreover, in order to ensure that the physician's
values are not improperly imposed upon patients and their fami-
lies, such parties would have the right to appeal, first to the hospi-
tal ethics committee, and later, if need be, to the judicial system. 162
The necessary task of the ethics committee and the courts would
be to balance the personal values and rationale of the patient and
his family in requiting resuscitation, against the societal interests
in preventing futile, cruel and wasteful treatment. 63 If the adjudi-
cating body determines that the rationale for resuscitation is rea-
sonable and outweighs the gravity of prolonging the death of a dy-
ing or demented individual, then it should substitute its own judg-
ment for that of the physician, and remove the treating physician
from the case in order to prevent any subsequent slow code or-
der. 164 Otherwise, deference should be given to the expertise of the
physician and his unilateral decision not to resuscitate should be
upheld.
Although it has been asserted that the New York Do-Not-
Resuscitate Law has been effective as a means of codifying a
communal approach to medical decision-making, 165 clinical evi-
dence suggests that the same results can be achieved through insti-
tutional policy, thus making the burdensome provisions of the law
"redundant, inefficient and unnecessary."' 166 Legislative attempts to
Miles, Informed Demand for Non-beneficial Medical Treatment, 325 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 512 (1991) (discussing the conflict between the doctor and the patient's family
over what is appropriate medical care).
159 See Morreim, supra note 158, at 35.
160 See Smith, supra note 5, at 18.
161 Id. at 19.
162 See id. at 18.
163 See id. at 17-20.
164 See id.
165 See Kamer, & McClung, supra note 106, at 232-33.
166 Id. See generally Alan Meisel et al., Seven Barriers to End-of-Life Care:
Myths, Realities, and Grains of Truth, 24 JAMA 2495 (2000).
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contour and then mandate standards of reasonable medical judg-
ment are to be avoided - for they rob both patient and physician of
their healing alliance. Institutional policies should be developed
and maintained which center on the patient's (or, in the event of
incompetence, the surrogate's) informed consent, as well as the
education of health care workers with respect to the law. 67 These
policies or guidelines must maintain a critical balance - they must
set out the specific requirements for a properly issued DNR order
without being so restrictive as to force physicians to return to the
use of slow codes. If an institution creates or adopts a working
definition of futility, it will - as seen - be instrumental in its ef-
forts to maintain this balance. Additionally, acceptance of the futil-
ity doctrine can serve as an impetus for attaining macro economic
utility in the distribution of health care resources. 
168
If the institutional guidelines are unduly restrictive or open to
misinterpretation, the physicians will likely provide futile CPR.
Since the administration of futile medical treatment is tantamount
to inflicting cruel and unusual punishment, a physician has a
moral, ethical, and legal duty to prohibit such treatment. 69 Clear
guidelines that recognize a patient's limited right to receive treat-
ment combined with a working definition of futility can dissuade a
physician's use of slow codes. If the physician does not have to
resort to covert issuance of DNR orders, he can maintain an open
channel of communication to the patient.
In order for all of these steps or suggestions to be codified and
implemented successfully as constructs for decision-making there
must be a level of educated communication opened between pa-
tient and physician. A will to understand the reality of death is,
sadly, all too often clouded by emotions and not guided by rational
thinking. It is here where, ultimately, a physician must - consistent
with these suggested guidelines - exercise his informed profes-
sional judgment and act in the best interest of his patient thereby
assuring not only a humane outcome but one that does not impose
an undue economic burden on the patient, his family, and society.
167 See generally Smith, supra note 5, for a recommendation of a definition of
futility.
1" See id. at 36 (discussing societal benefits obtainable by defining medical futil-
ity).169 See id. at 32-34.
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